The Nuclear Weapons – the Myths of Military Analysts

The debate on nuclear weapons in India have been appropriated by a curious breed called “strategic experts” or “defence analysts”. Hidden under such names is the simple fact that they are primarily military analysts and closely tied to the defence establishment in the country. Thus, Udey Bhaskar, Jasjit Singh, K. Subramanyam and their media progenies are or have been a part of and parcel of the defences establishment of this country and are not independent analysts by any means. The appropriation of the nuclear debate by military experts completely negate the multi-dimensional aspect of nuclear weapons. Weapons of  mass destructions which can finish all civilisational on this earth can not be seen in a narrow military framework.

The narrow military framework is what set off the nuclear arms race in the Post World War II era. The US used nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki not to end the second World War but to seek global dominance in the Post World War II scenario as the sole nuclear weapons power. The military experts then argued that the US had nuclear monopoly for the foreseeable future and as it had already shown its willingness to use it, they could shape the post war world as they liked it. With the 1949 atomic tests by Soviet Union, this monopoly was ended. The military experts continued their war games by arguing that a nuclear war was winnable — that with a first strike a nation’s nuclear arsenal could be taken out and then that country could be nuked to extinction. To prevent a country’s nuclear arsenal from being taken out, the military experts argued for large number of weapons and nuclear tipped missiles, anti ballastic missiles,  mobile missiles, mutiple warhead missiles with each warhead capable of willing an independent target, etc. Thus one Ohio Class submarine alone in the US Navy was capable of nuking more than 400 cities. By the 80’s, such a mad rush towards nuclear weapons saw more than 50,000 warheads being stockpiled in US and USSR with a capability of blowing up the world several hundred times.   With each side preparing automatic retaliation in the case of an impending missile strike, the world was always on the brink of a total annihilation, even by mistake. Such mistakes did occur, not once but on a number of occasions. Thus, a flight of geese, the full moon, etc., were detected as “impending missile strikes” and only human intervention saved a retaliatory strike.

It is important to note that the scientific community, which was the only other section closely involved with nuclear weapons and the entire weapons and missile systems, had a strikingly different response to nuclear weapons. By and large, the scientific community concluded very early on that a nuclear weapon should never be used. Even the Manhattan team which developed the atom bomb, was completely opposed to its use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The scientific community produced evidence to show that nuclear weapons would lead to large parts of the earth being devastated not only for now but for thousands of generations. In the 70’s, they also modelled the effect of nuclear weapons on the atmosphere and concluded that even if one of the countries “won” the nuclear war through a successful first strike, the resulting “nuclear winter” caused by enormous dust clouds thrown up by the atomic explosions would finish all life on earth. In other words, there was no winnable nuclear war.

The military analysts responded by first questioning the basis of nuclear winter. Further, they propounded the theory that small nuclear bombs, called tactical nuclear weapons could be used without such devastating consequences. The use of tactical nuclear weapons means that the command to issue a nuclear strike would then have to be decentralised to battle field commanders. Simple common sense back up by simulation exercises showed that battlefield nuclear weapons would rapidly escalate with their use by field commanders leading to a similar holocaust as predicted by the scientists in the nuclear winter scenario.

Having failed in their attempts to create a credible nuclear weapons scenario, the military analysts shifted their tack. They  then argued that nuclear weapons were weapons of deference — they kept the world safe form a World War. As the spectre of all nations armed with such “peacekeeping” nuclear weapons began to haunt the world, the created the argument that such peacekeeping nuclear weapons were good only for a few mature nuclear powers — the rest should not go in for such weapons. This despite the fact that nuclear weapons states such as US has consistently refused to give a “no first strike” pledge even against non-nuclear states. Neither did the military analysts explain how weapons that can never used, could provide the “magic” of deterrence.

The reason for going back to the history of nuclear weapons debates is only to see how the military analysts have viewed nuclear weapons and how this is at sharp variance with the rest of the human population. Scientists, physician and in the 90’s the jurists, have all argued that nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction are illegal, inhuman and the there should be total nuclear disarmament. The military analysts initially argued for a winnable nuclear war, for tactical nuclear weapons and preserving the existing nuclear arsenal for deterrence, if not for use.

The military analysts, primarily in the US have fuelled the nuclear weapons and missile race in the world. General Lee Buther, who commanded the nuclear arm of the US Airforce and the US Navy and now campaigns for complete nuclear disarmament has this to say about this mad nuclear arms race.
“.. it is distressingly evident that for many people, nuclear weapons retain an aura of utility, of primacy and of legitimacy that justifies their existence well into the future, in some number, however small. The persistence of this view, which is perfectly reflected in the recently announced modification of U. S. nuclear weapons policy, lies at thecore of the concern that moves me so deeply. This abiding faith in nuclear weapons was inspired and is sustained by a catechism instilled over many decades by a priesthood who speak with great assurance and authority. I was for many years among the most avid of these keepers of the faith in nuclear weapons, and for that I make no apology. Like my contemporaries, I was moved by fears and fired by beliefs that date back to the earliest days of the atomic era. We lived through a terror-ridden epoch punctuated by crises whose resolution held hostage the saga of humankind. For us, nuclear weapons were the savior that brought an implacable foe to his knees in 1945 and held another at bay for nearly a half-century. We believed that superior technology brought strategic advantage, that greater numbers meant stronger security, and that the ends of containment justified whatever means were necessary to achieve them.

These are powerful, deeply rooted beliefs. They cannot and should not be lightly dismissed or discounted. Strong arguments can be made on their behalf. Throughout my professional military career, I shared them, I professed them and I _ut them into operational practice. And now it is my burden to declare with all of the conviction I can muster that in my judgement they served us extremely ill. They account for the most severe risks and most extravagant costs of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. They intensified and prolonged an already acute ideological animosity. They spawned successive generations of new and more destructive nuclear devices and delivery systems. They gave rise to mammoth bureaucracies with gargantuan appetites and global agendas. They incited primal emotions, spurred zealotry and demagoguery, and set in motion forces of ungovernable scope and power. Most importantly, these enduring beliefs, and the fears that underlie them, perpetuate cold war policies and practices that make no strategic sense. They continue to entail enormous costs and expose all mankind to unconscionable dangers.”