|
Vol.
XXV No. 40
October 07,2001 |
USAs War
Infinite Justice,
Finite Targets II
Raghu
THE campaign
realities discussed in the first part of the article have strategic implications in the
region around Afghanistan which are likely to further unfold in the coming weeks. Since
the direct use of naval including carrier-based forces is likely to be less, the emphasis
would be on land bases near Afghanistan. The US has already deployed surveillance and
troop transport aircraft in Uzbekistan and is likely to also obtain access to base
facilities at least for such support in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan too, especially now that
Russia has given them a green signal. Turkmenistan may also come on board later although
it has been highly reluctant to date.
GROUND OPERATION
Some defence
analysts have speculated that if ground operations are undertaken they would be launched
from these northern neighbours of Afghanistan with whom it has long borders, much of it
demarcated by rivers not difficult to cross and with wide flat steppes on either side
facilitating vehicular movement unlike the more mountainous areas to the south. However,
this scenario seems unlikely for several reasons.
Russia would not
view positively any large-scale US or NATO troop deployment in Central Asia where it
itself has over 25,000 troops in Tajikistan for instance and which Russia regards as a
crucial buffer between it and states to the south. The greater likelihood is that
these bases would be used to provide support to the forces of the anti Taliban Northern
Alliance in terms of more weaponry, ammunition and other supplies, and even air cover.
In such a
scenario, Pakistan is the more likely base for ground forces despite the military and
political limitations. Given the mostly mountainous terrain, entry points into Afghanistan
from Pakistan are few, chiefly from Peshawar towards Jalalabad in the south-east and from
Quetta in Baluchistan towards Kandahar in the south-west, and being relatively narrow in
field are more vulnerable to counter-attack. Rather than large ground force deployment,
helicopter-based commando operations backed by air strikes from these locations in
Pakistan are then the more probable scenario. Pakistan and the US would both like to avoid
this and lean towards bases in the Central Asian states given their common desire to
minimise the Pakistani ruling establishments internal problems in dealing with
Islamist opposition, but there may be little option.
IMPLICATIONS IN
THE REGION
All this may
enable the US-led forces to capture or eliminate Osama bin Laden and destroy much of the
Talibans larger military assets and even, along with other ground operations, drive
the Taliban out of Kabul and Kandahar. But, in the medium term, it may not have as much
impact on the Taliban and other international jehadi forces in Afghanistan. These
forces could withdraw into the mountains paving the way for the more protracted campaigns
which have been the notorious graveyard for so many invading or occupying forces in
Afghanistan, the last of whom to have succeeded being Alexander the Great who too did not
stay for long. This would imply a continued long-term presence of US and allied forces in
the region, still operating from Pakistan and other neighbouring countries in preference
to a presence inside Afghanistan, in support of whatever dispensation is put in to replace
the Taliban in Kabul.
A serious worry
in the region is the possibility of massive influx of refugees from Afghanistan in the
event of hostilities breaking out. Central Asian Republics, Iran and even China are
doubly anxious at the possibility of fundamentalist and militant elements coming in along
with the other refugees and posing threats in the future. Pakistan itself is likely to be
badly affected if its internal opponents are joined by militant Taliban and other jehadi
forces. While Pakistan, along with other neighbouring countries, has claimed to have
sealed its border with Afghanistan, most of the 1700 km long mountainous border region is
highly porous and populated by fiercely independent tribal chieftains with no particularly
national loyalties. This is also likely to provide fresh impetus to separatist tendencies,
dormant for some time under pressure of both military action and events in Afghanistan
coming to the fore in these peoples minds, in both Pakhtoon and Baluch areas along the
northern areas of Pakistan. These tendencies are likely to gain momentum if the Taliban
dispensation is replaced in Afghanistan since all its predecessors have had an uneasy
relationship with Pakistan and have not recognised the Durand line taken by Pakistan to be
the Pak-Afghan border.
CONTEMPLATED
SET-UP IN AFGHANISTAN
Serious moves
have already begun to fashion a post-Taliban set up in Kabul as if the war had already
been won. Current favourites are the Northern Alliance being the military arm and the
government in Kabul being led by the exiled King Zahir Shah.
The Northern
Alliance is the term loosely applied to all the somewhat disparate forces who were once
part of the mujahideen rallying together against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan but
who later went into armed opposition against the Taliban. The Alliance comprises not only
the political opponents of the Taliban but also most non-Pakhtoon ethnic and religious
minorities of who were severely marginalised by the Pakhtoon-dominated Taliban who imposed
the Pushtu language and Deobandi fundamentalist Islam on the highly varied ethnic,
linguistic, religious and cultural mosaic of Afghanistan.
The Alliance
includes the mainly Tajik and Farsi-speaking Jamaat-i-Islami forces under the late
Commander Ahmad Shah Masood, “Lion of Panjshir”, the valley to the north of
Kabul in which it chiefly operates; the mainly Shiite Islamic Unity Party operating
chiefly in Bamiyan province and including the minority Hazaras who were subjected to
ethnic cleansing, mass murders and severe persecution under the Taliban; the mainly
Turkic-speaking Uzbek forces of the National Islamic Alliance led by general Rashid Dostum
in the area around the strategic northern town of Mazar-e-Sharif and some other scattered
opposition forces in other parts of the country. All these forces are components or
supporters of the government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani which is recognised by the UN and
most other countries including India. The notable absentee is the Hizb-e-Islami led by
Professor Burhanuddins erstwhile partner, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who has declared his
support for the Taliban from his base in eastern Iran.
These forces,
united under King Zahir Shah, himself a Pakhtoon heading a large landed aristocracy, could
certainly unite the Afghan people and restore earlier traditions of Afghan rule including
due role to Dari (the local term for Farsi deriving from darbari or language of the court)
as lingua franca as it had earlier been and rule on behalf of all ethnic minorities
through a revived loyal jirgah comprising tribal chieftains, religious leaders,
intellectuals and other community leaders. Such a dispensation in Kabul would doubtless
please various regional powers including India, Russia, the secular former Soviet Central
Asian Republics and even Iran. Clearly the unhappiest would be Pakistan, whose hackles
have already been raised by such a prospect however remote. No wonder General Musharraf
told India to “lay off” in connection with the Dushanbe conference to discuss
future plans in Afghanistan in which India also participated.
While all this
is going on, the BJP-led government continues in its somnolent ways. Its diplomatic moves
are mostly reactive, directly almost exclusively at the US, and with only tentative moves
towards Russia, Iran and other regional players. It has further reduced its
manoeuvrability by continuing high-level discussions with Israel while Palestine and the
mid-East are in flames, further isolating itself from Islamic countries as never before. India
has played little or no pro-active role and has chosen to confine itself to backroom
diplomacy. The BJP-led government has not realised, even after the fiasco in Agra,
that campaigning through the media and public opinion is a crucial part of contemporary
diplomacy. Unfortunately, when it comes to the media, foreign minister Jaswant Singh
continues to rely more on his baritone and clipped British accent, which have long lost
their charm, than on content. While the military dictatorship in Pakistan holds
wide-ranging consultations with all sections of Pakistani society and polity, in
democratic India even the BJPs NDA allies are scarcely consulted and the Opposition
almost never. The 21st century version of the Great Game is afoot, but the
Indian player is nowhere to be seen.
(Concluded)
