|
Vol.
XXVII No.
February
|
Indias
Nuclear
War
Plans
DANGEROUS
PORTENTS
—
II
N
D
Jayaprakash
IN
the
CCS
statement,
two
new
elements
have
been
introduced
into
the
No
First
Use
posture.
Firstly,
in
the
original
DND
retaliation
would
have
been
in
response
to
any
nuclear
attack
on
India
and
its
forces
(para
2.3b,
DND,
op
cit.)
The
same
has
now
been
modified
to
mean
that
nuclear
weapons
will
be
used
in
retaliation
against
a
nuclear
attack
on
Indian
territory
or
on
Indian
forces
anywhere
(PMO,
op
cit.).
That
Indian
forces
are
going
to
be
anywhere
is
certainly
a
revelation.
The
government
owes
an
explanation
to
the
Indian
people
as
to
what
it
means.
It
certainly
cannot
mean
peacekeeping
missions
under
the
aegis
of
the
United
Nations,
because
Indian
forces
during
such
missions
have
not
so
far
been
engaged
in
any
peace
breaking
activities
unlike
the
US
forces.
There
is
absolutely
no
reason
why
Indian
forces,
which
engages
themselves
in
credible
peace
making
activities,
should
come
under
a
nuclear
attack.
(But
any
likely
military
deployment
abroad
by
India,
which
is
outside
the
pale
of
the
UN,
would
be
questionable
and
should
not
be
undertaken
in
the
first
place.)
Secondly,
unlike
the
DND,
the
CCS
states
that
in
the
event
of
a
major
attack
against
India,
or
Indian
forces
anywhere,
by
biological
or
chemical
weapons,
India
will
retain
the
option
of
retaliating
with
nuclear
weapons
(ibid).
This
is
again
a
very
questionable
posture.
Does
this
mean
that
if
there
is
a
major
chemical
disaster
for
which
say
a
US
multinational
company
(e.g.
Union
Carbide
Corporation
in
the
Bhopal
gas
leak
disaster
of
December
1984)
is
culpable,
will
the
government
of
India
then
consider
the
option
of
targeting
the
United
States
with
nuclear
weapons?
How
will
discretion
be
exercised?
Effectively,
this
posture
would
mean
that
India
is
going
back
on
its
No-First-Use
pledge.
When
chemical
or
biological
agents
are
released
by
firing
artillery
shells
it
may
not
be
difficult
to
identify
the
aggressor.
But
the
magnitude
of
the
damage
that
could
be
inflicted
through
such
a
process
would
be
very
limited
and
cannot
even
theoretically
justify
a
nuclear
response.
Under
other
circumstances,
identifying
the
aggressor
is
going
to
be
quite
problematic
just
as
in
the
case
of
a
nuclear
attack.
A
nuclear
response
to
any
situation
might
be
a
very
convenient
belligerent
stance
but
that
would
only
compound
the
problem
and
can
never
bring
about
any
solution.
All
types
of
terrorism
can
be
contained
once
its
global
links
are
severed.
What
is
required
is
international
co-operation
in
eliminating
the
menace;
there
is
no
other
short
cut.
In
an
attempt
to
tone
down
the
bellicosity,
the
CCS
has
reiterated
that
it
would
remain
committed
to:
(1)
Non-use
of
nuclear
weapons
against
non-nuclear
weapon
states;
and
(2)
A
continuance
of
strict
controls
on
export
of
nuclear
and
missile
materials
and
technologies,
participation
in
the
Fissile
Material
Cut-off
Treaty
negotiations,
and
continued
observance
of
the
moratorium
on
nuclear
tests.
That
the
government
has
chosen
to
standby
these
commitments
is
a
sign
of
sobriety.
The
CCS
also
re-emphasised
Indias
Continued
commitment
to
the
goal
of
a
nuclear
weapon
free
world,
through
global,
verifiable
and
non-discriminatory
nuclear
disarmament
(ibid).
However,
if
this
laudatory
pronouncement
was
not
followed
up
with
concrete
action,
there
is
a
high
propensity
that
the
same
would
become
a
mere
cover
for
concealing
aggressive
nuclear
war
plans.
To
assume
that
the
onus
of
pursuing
the
goal
of
global
nuclear
disarmament
is
that
of
someone
else
is
a
convenient
way
of
passing
the
buck
and
to
quietly
shy
away
from
taking
on
the
responsibility.
ITCHING
FOR
WAR
The
CCS,
which
announced
the
setting
up
of
a
Nuclear
Command
Authority
-
a
two-tier
body
consisting
of
a
Political
Council
and
an
Executive
Council
-
has
tried
to
imply
that
India
is
a
responsible
nuclear
weapon
power.
It
has
claimed
that
only
the
Political
Council
chaired
by
the
prime
minister
(ibid)
[hopefully
meaning
the
elected
leadership]
of
the
country
can
take
the
dreaded
decision
to
initiate
a
nuclear
strike.
But
this
announcement
is
hardly
reassuring
considering
the
fact
that
it
was
an
elected
government
in
the
United
States
that
took
the
reprehensible
decision
to
use
nuclear
weapons
on
Hiroshima
and
Nagasaki
in
August
1945
when
an
already
defeated
Japan
was
on
the
verge
of
surrender.
While
the
ultimate
decision
to
use
the
horrendous
weapon
may
rest
with
the
civilian
leadership,
the
fact
is
that
effective
control
over
nuclear
weapons
as
expected
would
remain
with
the
military.
A
Strategic
Forces
Command
has
already
been
set
up
for
the
purpose
and
the
CCS
has
appointed
a
Commander-in-Chief
for
the
same
to
manage
and
administer
all
strategic
forces.
The
CCS
also
indicated
that
it
has
reviewed
and
approved
the
arrangements
for
alternate
chains
of
command
for
retaliatory
nuclear
strikes
in
all
eventualities
(ibid).
The
way
this
statement
has
been
formulated
underlines
the
cold
and
insensitive
manner
in
which
the
proponents
of
the
nuclear
doctrine
are
treating
the
issue.
That
the
prime
minister
of
the
country
could
get
knocked
out
in
the
very
first
nuclear
strike
is
presented
as
just
a
matter-of-fact.
That
millions
of
Delhiites
would
perish
along
with
the
PM
is
left
unsaid
because
it
is
of
little
consequence.
The
whole
emphasis
is
on
ensuring
that
there
would
be
a
next-in-command
who
would
be
empowered
to
give
the
deadly
signal
for
a
retaliatory
strike.
It
is
as
though
the
authors
of
this
abhorrent
doctrine
are
hoping
that
someone
(preferably
Pakistan)
would
carry
out
a
nuclear
first
strike
on
India
so
they
can
retaliate
in
a
manner
that
would
inflict
unacceptable
damage
on
the
aggressor.
They
are
just
itching
to
retaliate
because
their
entire
focus
is
on
retaliation
and
not
on
initiating
concrete
steps
towards
preventing
a
nuclear
war.
The
saddest
part
is
that
the
urgency
of
preventing
a
nuclear
war
has
become
a
non-issue
as
far
as
the
CCS
was
concerned.
They
are
content
to
pay
ritualistic
lip
service
to
the
cause
of
nuclear
disarmament
and
to
do
little
else.
On
the
contrary,
the
stress
is
on
overall
preparedness
of
the
existing
command
and
control
structures,
the
state
of
readiness,
the
targeting
strategy
for
a
retaliatory
attack,
and
operating
procedures
for
various
stages
of
alert
and
launch
(ibid).
Any
reference
to
Indias
long
held
principled
stand
that
the
use
of
nuclear
weapons
constitutes
a
violation
of
the
UN
Charter
and
a
crime
against
humanity
is
consciously
avoided.
In
fact
the
very
phrase
to
prevent
use
of
nuclear
weapons
was
completely
missing
from
the
entire
text
of
even
the
original
DND!
Nuclear
war-fighting
is
the
strategy
that
has
now
captured
the
imagination
of
the
CCS.
SPACE
FORCE
Another
matter
that
has
caused
concern
is
the
proposal
put
forward
inadvertently
by
the
president
of
India,
Dr
Abdul
Kalam.
In
a
speech
titled
Vision
for
the
Global
Space
Community:
Prosperous,
Happy
and
Secure
Planet
Earth
(http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120032.html)
that
was
delivered
at
the
Space
Summit
of
the
90th
Session
of
the
Indian
Science
Congress
at
Bangalore
on
January
4,
2003,
Dr
Kalam,
spoke
of
the
need
for
an
International
Space
Force.
While
it
is
very
evident
that
the
president
had
not
referred
to
the
Space
Force
with
any
sinister
motive,
the
implications
of
his
suggestion
would
actually
be
quite
contrary
to
what
he
had
in
mind.
Dr
Kalam
had
correctly
recognised
the
necessity
for
the
worlds
space
community
to
avoid
terrestrial
geo-political
conflict
to
be
drawn
into
outer
space,
thus
threatening
the
space
assets
belonging
to
all
mankind.
The
President
had
also
expressed
his
eagerness
to
protect
world
space
assets
in
a
manner
which
will
enable
peaceful
use
of
space
on
a
global
co-operative
basis
without
the
looming
threat
of
conflict
on
earth.
But
the
International
Space
Force
that
Dr
Kalam
wants
to
establish
would
itself
become
the
biggest
stumbling
block
in
the
way
of
attaining
the
important
objectives
that
he
has
highlighted.
On
the
other
hand,
what
was
required
was
not
the
setting
up
of
a
group
of
protectors
but
the
total
de-militarisation
of
space
so
that
all
assets
could
be
preserved
and
shared
in
a
co-operative
manner
for
the
benefit
of
all
humankind.
The
biggest
threat
that
is
looming
large
today
is
the
concerted
attempt
of
the
United
States
to
militarise
space
in
a
bid
to
impose
its
will
over
the
rest
of
humanity.
Under
the
circumstances,
the
danger
is
that
any
attempt
to
create
an
International
Space
Force
may
in
the
end
just
turn
out
to
be
a
mere
euphemism
for
a
US
Space
Force.
The
presidents
noble
vision
to
enable
peaceful
use
of
space
on
a
global
co-operative
basis
would
then
remain
only
a
pipe
dream.
It
is
in
this
context
that
the
presidents
suggestion
appears
alarming.
The
apprehension
seems
well
justified
considering
the
fact
that
India
has
held
a
two-day
official
level
talks
with
the
United
States
on
the
so-called
Missile
Defence
on
January
15-16,
2003.
These
talks
were
a
continuation
of
two
rounds
of
discussions
held
in
May
2001
and
May
2002.
It
may
be
recalled
that
in
total
contravention
of
its
principled
stand
against
militarisation
of
space,
the
government
of
India
on
May
2,
2001
became
the
first
major
government
to
declare
tacit
support
to
the
Missile
Defence
system
propounded
by
the
US
Administration.
It
marked
a
major
break
from
Indias
purported
policy
of
Non-Alignment.
The
Missile
Defence
system
is
very
much
an
integral
part
of
the
US
strategic
framework
to
militarise
space
through
its
preposterous
Star
War
plans.
By
opting
to
play
second
fiddle
to
the
US
in
this
sinister
programme,
the
government
of
India
has
completely
compromised
the
vital
interests
of
the
country.
If
the
grotesque
plan
ever
gets
going
the
mass
of
humanity
will
be
forced
to
pay
a
heavy
price.
A
SHARP
CONTRAST
The
questionable
policies
that
the
government
of
India
is
pursuing
at
home
and
at
a
bilateral
level
is
in
sharp
contrast
to
the
forthright
policies
it
has
been
upholding
in
several
international
fora,
especially
in
the
United
Nations.
Indias
Permanent
Representative
to
the
Conference
on
Disarmament,
Rakesh
Sood,
while
speaking
at
the
57th
Session
of
the
First
Committee
of
the
UN
General
Assembly
on
October
7,
2002,
had
made
the
following
announcement.
He
stated
that
the
Indian
delegation
was
bringing
before
this
committee
yet
again,
as
it
has
done
since
1982,
the
resolution
calling
for
a
convention
to
be
negotiated
for
prohibiting
the
use
or
threat
of
use
of
nuclear
weapons
under
any
circumstances.
Mr
Sood
also
said
that:
Indias
resolution
entitled
Reducing
Nuclear
Danger
will
be
presented
to
this
committee
for
the
fifth
consecutive
year
with
the
expectation
that
it
will
receive
wider
support
and
convince
those
who
are
still
skeptical
of
the
need
for
early
concrete
action
(http://www.meadev.nic.in/govt/rakeshsood-7oct.htm).
The
UN
General
Assembly
adopted
the
two
above-mentioned
resolutions
on
November
22,
2002
with
the
support
of
both
India
and
Pakistan.
The
resolution
for
a
Convention
on
the
Prohibition
of
the
Use
of
Nuclear
Weapons
(A/RES/57/94
-see
http://disarmament.un.org/)
was
passed
by
110
to
45
votes
with
12
abstentions
(with
the
entire
NATO
block
and
its
supporters
opposing
it).
While
the
resolution
on
Reducing
Nuclear
Danger
(A/RES/57/84)
was
passed
by
107
to
46
votes
with
17
abstentions.
Both
India
and
Pakistan
have
extended
support
to
yet
another
important
resolution
titled
Follow-up
to
the
advisory
opinion
of
the
International
Court
of
Justice
on
the
Legality
of
the
Threat
or
Use
of
Nuclear
Weapons.
The
UN
General
Assembly
adopted
this
resolution
(A/RES/57/85)
also
on
November
22,
2002
by
161
to
4
votes
with
1
abstention.
(Those
who
voted
against
were
France,
Israel,
Russia
and
USA,
while
UK
chose
to
abstain
-
leaving
little
doubt
that
they
are
the
five
powers
that
constitute
the
biggest
stumbling
block
in
way
of
global
nuclear
disarmament.)
India
and
Pakistan
were
also
among
the
group
of
nations
that
sponsored
and
supported
the
resolution
(A/RES/57/57)
on
Prevention
of
an
Arms
Race
in
Outer
Space,
which
was
passed
in
the
General
Assembly
by
159
votes
to
0
with
3
abstentions
(Israel,
Micronesia
and
USA).
However,
it
is
a
little
too
premature
to
be
euphoric
about
the
support
that
these
resolutions
have
received.
As
Indias
representative,
Rakesh
Sood,
has
pointed
out:
The
political
will
necessary
to
kick-start
the
negotiations
of
long
awaited
and
future
oriented
disarmament
treaties
has
not
been
in
evidence
for
yet
another
year.
If
we
do
not
get
our
act
together,
we
are
in
danger
of
engaging
in
activities
full
of
sound
and
fury,
signifying
nothing.
He
further
added
that:
we
need
to
shake
ourselves
out
of
our
stupor
and
take
concrete
initiatives
that
address
both
the
issues
that
have
remained
with
us
for
long
and
those
that
have
emerged
in
the
post
September
11,
2001
context
(Mr
Soods
statement,
op
cit).
STEM
THE
DRIFT
It
is
time
that
the
government
of
India
itself
first
took
heed
of
Mr
Soods
plea.
The
point
is
that
both
India
and
Pakistan
have
on
the
floor
of
the
UN
General
Assembly
unequivocally
supported
several
resolutions
in
favour
of
global
nuclear
disarmament
and
against
the
arms
race.
They
both
claim:
(1)
that
they
support
a
convention
on
prohibiting
the
use
or
threat
of
use
of
nuclear
weapons
under
any
circumstances;
(2)
that
they
are
ready
to
take
all
necessary
steps
to
reduce
the
nuclear
danger;
(3)
that
the
only
defence
against
a
nuclear
catastrophe
is
the
total
elimination
of
nuclear
weapons;
(4)
that
they
recognise
the
need
to
commence
negotiations
for
the
complete
elimination
of
nuclear
weapons
with
a
specified
framework
of
time;
and
(5)
that
they
are
against
an
arms
race
in
outer
space.
Then
why
is
it
not
possible
for
the
two
nations
to
reiterate
the
same
at
a
bilateral
level
on
a
joint
platform?
Instead,
what
is
happening
is
that,
outside
the
four
walls
of
the
UN
and
especially
at
home,
the
two
neighbours
are
constantly
at
loggerheads
and
rattling
their
nuclear
sabre
at
each
other.
(The
rare
exception
is
the
Agreement
on
the
Prohibition
of
Attack
Against
Nuclear
Installations
and
Facilities
between
India
and
Pakistan,
which
was
signed
in
1988*.
As
to
why
similar
agreements
cannot
be
signed
bilaterally
to
prevent
a
nuclear
war
or,
for
that
matter,
any
war
between
the
two
is
inexplicable.)
[*The
agreement
came
into
force
in
1991.
Under
the
agreement,
the
two
countries
are
to
inform
each
other
on
January
1
of
every
calendar
year
of
the
nuclear
installations
and
facilities
to
be
covered
by
the
Agreement.
The
12th
such
exchange
took
place
on
January
1,
2003.
See
TheHindu,
Delhi,
January
2,
2003]
It
may
not
be
an
exaggeration
to
say
that
the
leaders
in
both
India
and
Pakistan
try
to
conceal
from
their
peoples
as
much
as
possible
about
their
common
and
often
joint
activities
in
the
UN
for
furthering
the
cause
of
world
peace.
Any
way
it
cannot
be
denied
that
hardly
any
publicity
is
given
to
these
efforts.
At
home
they
are
more
pre-occupied
with
rabble-rousing
and
little
else.
Demonisation
of
each
other
caters
to
the
wild
passions
of
the
religious
right
and
conflating
hatred
of
the
other
community
with
defence
of
ones
nation
is
done
so
as
to
extract
good
dividends
in
domestic
politics.
By
refusing
to
initiate
concrete
action
on
the
numerous
issues
on
which
they
have
a
common
position,
the
leadership
of
the
two
countries
are
only
deceiving
their
own
peoples.
Unless
the
concerned
citizens
of
India
and
Pakistan
rise
up
to
put
an
end
to
this
mindless
drift,
a
tragic
end
might
not
be
too
far
away
for
a
sizeable
section
of
humanity.
(Concluded)
