|
Vol.
XXVII No.
February
|
Indias
Nuclear
War
Plans
DANGEROUS
PORTENTS
N
D
Jayaprakash
TWO
concurrent
pronouncements
made
on
January
4,
2003
-
one,
a
major
policy
decision
by
the
Government
of
Indias
Cabinet
Committee
on
Security
(CCS)
and
the
other,
a
pious
wish
expressed
by
the
president
of
India,
Dr
A
P
J
Abdul
Kalam
-
are
ominous
signs
of
the
perilous
future
that
lies
ahead.
The
brief
press
release
issued
by
the
Prime
Ministers
Office
(PMO)
stated
that
the
CCS
had
met
today
to
review
the
progress
in
operationalising
of
Indias
nuclear
doctrine.
(Press
release
issued
by
the
PMO
at
http://pib.nic.in/archive/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html)
One
wondered
what
nuclear
doctrine
the
CCS
was
operationalising?
This
doubt
arose
because,
one
was
only
aware
of
a
Draft
Nuclear
Doctrine
(DND)
that
was
propounded
on
August
17,
1999,
when
the
National
Security
Advisor,
Brajesh
Mishra,
in
his
capacity
as
Convenor
of
the
National
Security
Advisory
Board
(NSAB),
had
released
the
document
for
public
discussion
and
debate
(http://www.meadev.nic.in/govt/opstm-indnucld.htm).
The
observations
that
Brajesh
Mishra
had
made
while
releasing
the
DND
document
are
very
significant
especially
in
the
present
context.
Brajesh
Mishra
had
then
said:
I
am
happy
to
present
to
you
the
draft
of
the
Nuclear
Doctrine
prepared
by
the
National
Security
Board
.
We
have
decided
to
make
this
document
public
in
keeping
with
our
position
in
favour
of
greater
transparency
in
decision-making.
Please
note
that
this
is
a
draft
proposed
by
the
NSAB
and
has
not
yet
been
approved
by
the
government.
That
will
have
to
wait
until
after
the
general
elections.(Ibid.)
Mishra
had
explicitly
stated
that
the
government
favoured
greater
transparency
in
decision-making
and
that
the
proposed
draft
had
not
yet
been
approved
by
the
government.
Brajesh
Mishra
was
well
aware
that
the
BJP-led
government
then
could
not
have
approved
the
DND
because
it
had
lost
its
mandate
to
govern
and
was
holding
office
only
temporarily.
It
was
the
duty
of
the
next
elected
government
to
set
the
process
in
motion.
NO
DEBATE
ON
DND
While
analysing
the
CCS
decision
in
the
light
of
the
statements
that
Mishra
had
made
earlier,
three
important
questions
follow:
First,
when
and
in
which
forums
and
to
what
extent
has
public
discussion
and
debate
taken
place
on
this
critical
national
issue
and
what,
if
any,
was
the
outcome?
; Second,
if
not,
why
did
the
government
decide
to
finalise
and
approve
the
DND
without
public
discussion,
debate
or
notice?
;
And
Third,
where
is
the
promised
transparency
in
decision
making
when
vital
decisions
having
crucial
bearing
on
the
lives
of
the
entire
population
of
the
nation
are
taken
surreptitiously?
It
is
therefore
incumbent
on
the
government
to
explain
its
precipitate
action
on
an
issue
of
great
national
importance
and
which
is
bound
to
have
far
wider
ramifications.
The
opposition
parties
in
India
are
yet
to
take
the
government
to
task
on
this
issue.
The
promised
public
discussion
and
debate
on
the
DND
did
not
take
place
probably
because
the
government
developed
cold
feet
out
of
fear
that
the
likely
outcome
of
such
a
debate
would
be
quite
contrary
to
their
expectations.
Maybe
it
was
apprehensive
that
the
questionable
proposals
in
the
DND
would
have
found
few
takers.
If
the
government
had
any
confidence
at
all
that
the
proposals
are
just
and
well
grounded,
there
was
absolutely
no
reason
why
it
should
have
shied
away
from
a
public
debate
on
the
issue.
It
is
becoming
increasingly
clear
that
in
the
name
of
defending
national
security
the
right-wing
BJP-dominated
government
is
merely
trying
to
pursue
its
sectarian
agenda
for
partisan
ends.
By
surreptitiously
approving
what
may
be
the
propounded
Draft
Nuclear
Doctrine
almost
verbatim
the
government
has
set
a
very
dangerous
precedent
both
in
terms
of
the
procedure
adopted
for
formulating
the
policy
as
well
as
the
substance
of
the
policy
itself.
SHOCKING
PROPOSAL
The
most
shocking
proposal
in
the
DND
was
about
the
necessity
of
cultivating
the
will
to
employ
nuclear
weapons
and
forces
(Para
2.6e,
DND
at
http://www.meadev.nic.in/govt/indnucld.htm).
This
was
the
core
proposal
around
which
rest
of
the
DND
had
evolved.
But
any
use
of
nuclear
weapons
would
necessarily
result
in
wanton
destruction
of
lives
and
property.
However,
conscientious
human
beings
would
have
found
even
a
mindless
thought
of
committing
such
genocide
absolutely
revolting.
So
the
authors
of
the
DND
have
come
up
with
a
bizarre
solution:
they
thought
it
was
imperative
to
inculcate
the
much-needed
pernicious
will
for
perpetrating
a
horrendous
crime
against
humanity.
Injection
of
insensitivity
into
the
thought
processes
of
sane
human
beings
was
an
intrinsic
requirement
for
pursuing
that
objective.
Essentially
it
would
entail
de-humanisation
of
the
individuals
involved
in
the
execution
of
the
dreaded
decision,
those
who
would
have
otherwise
retained
their
humanness.
(Is
this
kind
of
moulding
of
the
thought
process
any
different
from
that
of
the
terrorists
who
are
conditioned
to
indulge
in
senseless
killing
of
unarmed
and
innocent
civilians?)
It
may
also
entail
taking
of
appropriate
steps
to
ensure
that
the
pernicious
will
percolates
down
to
the
mass
of
people
so
that
they
endorse
despicable
decisions
as
a
matter
of
necessity
or
inevitability.
(At
a
micro
level,
the
attempt
to
condone
and
accept
the
unprecedented
communal
violence
in
Gujarat
through
a
process
of
internalisation
is
a
classic
example.
Committing
large-scale
atrocities
-
arson,
rape
and
murder
-
were
nothing
to
be
ashamed
of;
they
are
acts
that
have
become
a
matter
of
gaurav
or
pride.)
The
DND
was,
thus,
essentially
a
document
that
sanctified
and
sanitised
the
use
of
nuclear
weapons.
In
short,
it
is
a
doctrine
for
fighting
a
nuclear
war,
not
for
preventing
one!
The
justification
offered
for
formulating
such
a
policy
was
that
these
weapons
of
mass
destruction
would
be
used
only
in
a
retaliatory
strike,
which,
in
the
words
of
the
CCS,
will
be
massive
and
designed
to
inflict
unacceptable
damage
(PMO,
op
cit.)
on
the
adversary.
If
that
is
so,
it
is
again
an
admission
that
possessing
nuclear
weapons
would
neither
deter
the
adversary
from
launching
a
nuclear
strike
nor
protect
Indians
from
being
victims
of
such
an
attack.
The
utter
fallacy
of
the
doctrine
of
nuclear
deterrence
thereby
stands
completely
exposed.
None
of
the
proponents
of
this
doctrine
have
argued
that
stockpiling
of
nuclear
weapons
can
actually
prevent
a
catastrophe.
All
they
are
claiming
is
that
they
can
compound
such
a
catastrophe
several
times
over
through
a
retaliatory
strike!
Deterrence
is
bound
to
breakdown
at
some
point
because
deterrence
is
always
accompanied
by
nuclear
one-upmanship,
which
necessarily
results
in
a
never-ending
upward
spiralling
nuclear
arms
race
with
the
spectre
of
a
catastrophe
remaining
ever
imminent.
If
India
was
likely
to
be
targeted
in
a
nuclear
first
strike,
why
is
the
government
cagey
about
the
huge
scale
of
death
and
destruction
that
Indians
might
suffer
if
such
a
calamitous
strike
were
to
take
place?
Is
there
an
acceptable
level
of
damage
that
Indians
can
be
made
to
suffer?
If
possession
of
nuclear
weapons
cannot
protect
Indians
from
being
victims
of
a
nuclear
attack,
what
exactly
is
the
purpose
or
advantage
in
possessing
these
dreadful
weapons
of
mass
destruction?
Are
the
Indian
victims
of
a
nuclear
attack
supposed
to
find
solace
in
the
fact
that
in
a
retaliatory
strike
far
greater
number
of
people
residing
in
the
state
of
the
aggressor
would
be
killed?
Is
a
highly
deplorable
act
to
be
avenged
by
carrying
out
yet
another
equally
deplorable
act
against
a
mass
of
people
who
had
had
absolutely
no
role
in
the
decision
to
initiate
the
first
nuclear
strike?
Every
aggressor
deserves
to
be
punished
stringently.
But
is
the
aggressor
an
entire
people
or
the
decision-makers
in
the
concerned
state?
Who
has
to
be
punished?
Retaliation
is
against
whom?
Moreover,
there
is
a
serious
problem
about
identifying
the
Aggressor
State
since
India
can
be
targeted
from
any
point
on
Earth
with
Inter-Continental
Ballistic
Missiles
(ICBMs)
or
Intermediate
Range
Ballistic
Missiles
(IRBMs),
which
are
in
the
possession
of
several
nuclear
weapon
states.
(It
may
be
noted
that
except
China
and
India
none
of
the
other
nuclear
weapon
states
have
given
even
a
No
First
Use
pledge.)
This
being
the
case,
is
Pakistan
the
fixed
target
for
a
retaliatory
strike
irrespective
of
who
the
aggressor
is?
Any
way,
why
is
this
undue
emphasis
on
retaliation
and
revenge
instead
of
being
more
concerned
about
preventing
a
nuclear
war
and
on
saving
those
millions
of
precious
Indian
lives
(which
will
certainly
be
lost
in
a
nuclear
first
strike
or
subsequent
strikes)
in
the
first
place?
An
active
UN
and
the
UN
alone
can
effectively
contain
any
potential
threat
from
an
irrational
power.
The
problem
is
that
there
is
a
concerted
attempt
to
hijack
the
UN
and
to
prevent
it
from
acting
to
its
full
potential.
Unless
this
problem
is
urgently
remedied
by
the
mass
of
UN
members
and
a
concerted
attempt
is
made
to
uphold
the
laudable
goals
enshrined
in
the
UN
Charter,
the
world
will
always
be
in
the
grip
of
one
crisis
to
the
other.
Indias
current
nuclear
war
strategy
is
akin
to
the
senseless
policy
of
Mutually
Assured
Destruction
-
or
what
was
more
appropriately
called
the
MAD
policy
-
that
USA
and
the
Soviet
Union
(now
Russia)
have
pursued.
In
fact,
George
Fernandes,
Indias
controversial
defence
minister,
told
newspersons
on
January
7,
2003
that:
…if
the
[Indian]
deterrent
is
not
adequate
and
Pakistan
uses
the
bomb,
we
will
suffer
a
little
but
there
will
be
no
Pakistan
left
later
(see
The
Hindu,
Delhi,
January
8,
2003).
It
may
be
recalled
that
Fernandes
had
made
a
similar
statement
just
a
year
back
(see
The
Hindustan
Times,
Delhi,
December
30,
2001).
The
shrill
rhetoric
from
the
Pakistani
side
too
was
almost
on
the
same
lines.
PAKISTANS
APPROACH
Pakistan,
which
had
set
up
its
Nuclear
Command
Authority
on
February
2,
2000,
was
never
averse
to
making
boastful
claims.
Pakistans
president,
General
Pervez
Musharraf,
on
December
13,
2002
gloated
that
his
countrys
armed
forces
had
earned
the
distinction
of
defeating
the
enemy
without
fighting
a
war
in
the
recent
escalation
of
tensions
between
India
and
Pakistan
(see
The
Hindu,
Delhi,
December
14,
2002).
Subsequently,
while
addressing
Air
Force
veterans
in
Karachi
on
December
30,
2002,
Musharraf
had
reportedly
said:
I
personally
conveyed
messages
to
prime
minister
Vajpayee
through
every
international
leader
who
came
to
Pakistan
that
if
Indian
troops
moved
a
step
across
the
international
border
or
the
Line
of
Control,
they
should
not
expect
a
conventional
war
from
Pakistan.
I
believe
my
message
was
effectively
conveyed
to
Mr
Vajpayee
(see
The
Hindu,
Delhi,
December
31,
2002).
The
mass
media
had
immediately
interpreted
the
presidents
allusion
as
holding
out
a
nuclear
threat.
While
the
spokesperson
of
the
Pakistan
president,
Rashid
Qureshi,
maintained
that
president
Musharraf
did
not
talk
about
a
nuclear
war,
the
clarification
later
issued
by
the
president
himself
leaves
little
doubt
about
what
he
had
actually
meant.
Accusing
the
media
of
misinterpreting
his
remarks
on
an
unconventional
war
with
India,
the
Pakistan
president
told
reporters
in
Islamabad
on
January
3,
2003
that:
This
is
a
distortion
and
I
have
been
misquoted.
No
one
in
his
right
state
of
mind
can
talk
of
a
nuclear
war.
(So
far
so
good,
but
what
he
said
subsequently
nevertheless
betrayed
his
real
intentions.)
The
president
had
gone
on
to
add
that
he
was,
in
fact,
at
that
time
talking
in
the
context
of
Kashmir
and
had
said
that
if
any
one
tried
to
cross
the
Line
of
Control
then
there
would
be
a
guerrilla
warfare
(see
The
Hindu,
Delhi,
January
4,
2003).
President
Musharrafs
explanation
hardly
makes
any
sense
since
the
Indian
army,
which
was
ready
to
confront
the
regular
Pakistani
army,
could
not
have
been
deterred
by
the
threat
of
guerrilla
warfare!
Any
way
the
Indian
army
was
already
fighting
such
a
war
on
the
Indian
side
of
the
Line
of
Control.
Thus,
president
Musharrafs
claim
that
he
was
misquoted
is
not
very
convincing.
Indeed,
if
as
president
Musharraf
says
No
one
in
his
right
state
of
mind
can
talk
of
a
nuclear
war,
the
best
way
for
Pakistan
to
remove
any
such
misapprehension
is
by
giving
an
undertaking
of
No-First-Use
of
nuclear
weapons.
This
step
can
be
followed
immediately
by
a
No
War
Pact
between
the
two
neighbours
in
order
to
prevent
outbreak
of
any
war
-
both
conventional
as
well
as
unconventional
types,
including
what
is
called
cross-border
terrorism.
However,
what
is
happening
today
is
that
the
leadership
of
both
the
nations
is
currently
indulging
in
the
game
of
nuclear
brinkmanship,
which
poses
a
grave
threat
to
the
lives
of
the
people
of
the
two
countries.
Although
India
has
unilaterally
given
a
No
First
Use
pledge,
in
reality
the
pledge
has
become
a
mere
mask
behind
which
feverish
preparations
are
going
on
for
conducting
an
all
out
nuclear
war
(against
Pakistan
of
course).
This
is
apparent
in
the
original
DND
itself.
(According
to
the
India
Abroad
weekly,
the
Third
NSAB
has
recommended
the
abandonment
of
the
No
First
Use
pledge.
(see
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jan/09ia.htm)
This
disturbing
news
appears
credible
since
the
CCS
has
already
sought
to
dilute
the
pledge.
The
fact
that
Pakistan
refuses
to
follow
a
No
First
Use
policy
also
creates
serious
doubts
regarding
its
real
intentions.
The
only
difference
in
the
approach
of
the
two
sides
is
that,
on
the
one
hand,
the
Pakistani
leadership
practically
appears
to
eulogise
hara-kiri
by
claiming
the
140
million
people
of
Pakistan
are
fully
prepared
to
face
all
consequences
with
all
their
might
(see
The
Week,
Kochi,
January
6,
2002).
On
the
other
hand,
the
Indian
side
harps
on
the
inevitability
of
winning
the
nuclear
war
despite
a
little
suffering
in
the
process
(see
Mr
Fernandes
statement
of
January
6,
2003
quoted
above).
In
terms
of
numbers
little
would
actually
mean
several
million
Indian
casualties.
With
hundreds
of
millions
of
casualties
on
both
sides
what
a
victory
that
would
be!
Thankfully,
it
appears
that
the
Pakistani
side
is
now
trying
to
tone
down
the
rhetoric.
In
response
to
Fernandes
comment
that
India
could
absorb
a
nuclear
hit
and
annihilate
Pakistan
in
return,
Pakistans
information
minister,
Sheikh
Rashid
Ahmed,
reportedly
said:
We
will
not
initiate
nuclear
war,
and
this
is
our
policy
(Associated
Press
report
quoted
in
The
Hindu,
Delhi,
January
9,
2003).
If
Ahmeds
statement
is
the
current
stand
of
the
Pakistani
government,
it
indeed
is
a
very
welcome
move.
In
that
case
Pakistan
should
have
no
hesitation
in
formally
adhering
to
the
policy
of
No
First
Use,
which
would
be
a
major
step
towards
reducing
nuclear
tensions
between
the
two
neighbours.
A
No
First
Use
pledge
need
not
be
anything
more
than
an
expression
of
intent.
But
it
would
be
a
major
Confidence
Building
Measure
(CBM)
that
could
open
up
the
possibilities
of
more
meaningful
preventive
measures.
The
Pakistan
president,
Pervez
Musharaf,
has
also
tried
to
discount
the
possibility
of
an
accidental
nuclear
war
from
the
Pakistani
side
by
claiming
Missiles
and
[nuclear]
warheads
are
not
permitted
together.
There
is
a
geographical
separation
between
them
(see
The
Hindu,
Delhi,
January
11,
2003).
(To
be
continued)
